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Game-Theoretic Pricing and Selection with Fading Channels
Yuqing Ni?, Alex S. Leong†, Daniel E. Quevedo†, and Ling Shi?
Abstract— We consider pricing and selection with fading
channels in a Stackelberg game framework. A channel server
decides the channel prices and a client chooses which channel
to use based on the remote estimation quality. We prove the
existence of an optimal deterministic and Markovian policy
for the client, and show that the optimal policies of both
the server and the client have threshold structures when the
time horizon is finite. Value iteration algorithm is applied to
obtain the optimal solutions for both the server and client, and
numerical simulations and examples are given to demonstrate
the developed result.
Index Terms— Networked Control Systems, Pricing, Game
Theory, Markov decision process.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing demands of wireless communication
service, Networked Control Systems (NCSs) have been re-
placing the traditional wired network control systems. NCSs
utilize wireless channels to communicate between sensors
and estimators, and controllers and actuators [1]. It is well
known that compared to wired systems, NCSs have a lower
cost in installment, diagnosis, debugging and maintenance,
and have diverse applications, including manufacturing in-
dustries, public transportation, aerospace vehicles and even
military battles [2].
Sensors with sensing, computing and wireless communi-
cation capabilities measure ambient conditions and transmit
extracted and useful signals to remote estimators via wireless
channels [3]. However, transmission may suffer from packet
dropouts, delay, quantization and channel fading, which
affect the performance and stability of real time systems.
Transmission errors in physical network links and buffer
overflows due to congestion are the typical reasons for packet
dropouts [4]. Sinopoli et al. [5] show that if the average
packet arrival probability does not reach a certain threshold,
the system may diverge and will not be under control any
more.
Nowadays, timely and accurate information is of great
value. As the transmission service provider, the server should
determine the communication channel prices. The wireless
channel pricing for the server and channel selections for the
client (which here means the sensor) are important. Game
theory is introduced as a powerful tool to study the rational
players’ complex interactions. A player is rational if his
decisions are consistent with his objectives [6]. Generally, a
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Nash equilibrium is an optimal solution such that no player
can benefit more by changing his own strategy [7]. While
a Stackelberg game is a strategic game where players make
decisions sequentially. Saad et al. [8] apply game theory to
communication networks and consider cooperative scenarios,
referred to as coalitional game theory. Li et al. [9] consider
the remote state estimation of cyber-physical systems (CPSs)
under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in a Markov game
framework. They analyze the Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum
game. The issue of network pricing and bandwidth allocation
is addressed in [10] based on the Nash bargaining framework.
They show that the network revenue is maximized when the
pricing scheme depends on users’ budgets and bandwidth
demands. Pricing and allocation related problems are also
studied in [11] and [12]. Tushar et al. [13] study the pricing
and charging problem of a smart grid and plug-in electric
vehicle groups in a noncooperative Stackelberg game frame-
work. They prove the existence of a generalized Stackelberg
equilibrium (GSE) using convex optimization and provide
an algorithm which leads to the GSE state of the game.
However, scenarios in NCSs feature a dynamic process with
infinite time horizon. It is not a static optimization problem.
In this work, we investigate a remote estimation problem
with wireless communication channels. A Stackelberg game
framework is modeled to interpret interactions between the
sensor client and the channel server. The channel server
aims to maximize its revenue while the sensor client aims to
minimize the linear combination of remote estimation error
covariance and the cost in a sequential order. We analyze
the optimal policies for both players when they reach the
equilibrium.
There are related applications in real life. Take Google
Drive for an example, which provides 15 GB storage free of
charge [14]. Premium plans are available for users with more
storage space demands. For example, $1.99 / month with 100
GB, $9.99 / month with 1 TB and $99.99 / month with 10
TB are all upgraded alternatives. Obviously, network users
are more and more in need of cloud storage, online sharing
and backup. Some users are willing to pay more to enjoy
the privilege. This scenario can be modeled as a Stackelberg
game. As the resource holder, Google Drive is at a leading
position, who sets the rules first. To profit most, Google Drive
should ponder over its service and corresponding charge,
taking the general user market into consideration in advance.
While users decide whether to pay more based on their own
needs. Both players intend to maximize their benefits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the system model and the main problem.
Section III proves the existence and monotonicity of the
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optimal deterministic and Markovian policy in the finite time
horizon case. Section IV provides simulations and intuitive
interpretations. Section V draws conclusions.
Notation: For a matrix X , we use XT and Tr{X} to
denote its transpose and trace. When X is a positive semi-
definite matrix, it is written as X ≥ 0. For two symmetric
matrices X and Y , X ≥ Y means X −Y ≥ 0. R is the set
of real numbers. E[·] is the expectation of a random matrix
and E[·|·] is its conditional expectation. The notation P[·]
refers to probability. For functions f , f1, f2, f1 ◦ f2 is defined
as f1 ◦ f2(X) , f1( f2(X)) and f k is defined as f k(X) ,
f ◦ f · · · f︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
(X) with f 0(X) = X .
II. PROBLEM SETUP
A. System Model
Process Smart Sensor
Remote
Estimator
xk yk → xˆsk|k
γk = 1
γk = 0
Channel 1
Channel 2
Communication Network
ServerClient
Fig. 1. System block diagram
Consider the system in Fig. 1. The discrete linear time-
invariant (LTI) process is as follows:
xk+1 = Axk +wk, (1)
yk =Cxk + vk, (2)
where xk ∈ Rn is the process state vector, wk ∈ Rn is the
process noise which is i.i.d. zero-mean white Gaussian with
covariance Q≥ 0. The measurement collected by the sensor
is yk ∈ Rm. The measurement noise vk ∈ Rm is i.i.d. zero-
mean white Gaussian with covariance R> 0. The initial state
x0 is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with covariance
Π0≥ 0, which is uncorrelated with wk and vk. The pair (A,C)
is assumed to be observable and (A,
√
Q) is controllable.
The smart sensor in Fig. 1 is capable of running a local
Kalman filter. Its minimum mean-squared error state estimate
xˆsk|k and the corresponding error covariance P
s
k|k are
xˆsk|k = E [xk | y1, . . . ,yk] , (3)
Psk|k = E
[(
xk− xˆsk|k
)(
xk− xˆsk|k
)T | y1, . . . ,yk] , (4)
which are computed via a Kalman filter as follows:
xˆsk|k−1 = Axˆ
s
k−1|k−1, (5)
Psk|k−1 = AP
s
k−1|k−1A
T+Q, (6)
Kk = Psk|k−1C
T
[
CPsk|k−1C
T+R
]−1
, (7)
xˆsk|k = xˆ
s
k|k−1+Kk
(
yk−Cxˆsk|k−1
)
, (8)
Psk|k = P
s
k|k−1−KkCPsk|k−1. (9)
Anderson and Moore [15] show that the estimation error
covariance of the Kalman filter converges to a unique value
P no matter what the initial value is. Define the Lyapunov
operator h as h(X) , AXAT +Q and Riccati operator g˜ as
g˜(X),X−XCT [CXCT+R]−1 CX . We assume that the error
covariance at the smart sensor has already reached steady
state and let
Psk|k = P, k ≥ 0, (10)
where P is the unique positive semi-definite solution to g˜◦
h(X) = X as [15] shows.
The error covariance P satisfies:
hk1(P)≥ hk2(P) (11)
for any k1 ≥ k2 ≥ 0 (see [16]). Furthermore,
Tr
{
hk1
(
P
)}≥ Tr{hk2 (P)} . (12)
This well ordering of the estimation error covariance is
helpful to the further analysis.
Fig. 1 portrays a two-player scenario. The process
equipped with the smart sensor is the “client” and the
communication network belongs to the “server”. At each
time k, the server has the priority to decide the price of
the high quality channel 1, i.e., WH or WL. The price of the
low quality channel 2 is fixed, always W0. Without loss of
generality, we assume WH >WL >W0. It is then the client’s
turn to decide to use channel 1 or channel 2. If using channel
1, the probability that xˆsk|k arrives error-free at the remote
estimator is λ1. While using channel 2, the error-free arrival
probability is λ2, where 1 > λ1 > λ2 > 0.
The server sets the price of channel 1. Define the price Wk
of channel 1 at time k as
Wk =
{
WH , if the server sets high price,
WL, if the server sets low price.
(13)
The client decides whether to use channel 1 or not. Thus the
transmission of xˆsk|k in the communication network can be
characterized by a binary variable γk:
γk =
{
1, if the client uses channel 1,
0, if the client uses channel 2.
(14)
Furthermore, the arrival of packets at the remote estimator
can be characterized by a binary random sequence {δk}:
δk =
{
1, if xˆsk|k arrives error-free at time k,
0, otherwise.
(15)
Based on the error-free arrival probability of the two chan-
nels, we have
P [δk = 1] = γkλ1+(1− γk)λ2. (16)
B. Remote Estimator
Denote xˆk and Pk as the state estimate and error covariance
at the remote estimator. If the packet xˆsk|k arrives error-free
at time k, the estimator synchronizes xˆk with xˆsk|k from the
smart sensor; otherwise, it just uses the time update value
based on the system model (1). The recursion of xˆk is
xˆk =
{
xˆsk|k, if δk = 1,
Axˆk−1, if δk = 0.
(17)
Correspondingly, the recursion of Pk is
Pk =
{
P, if δk = 1,
h(Pk−1), if δk = 0.
(18)
To simplify the problem, we assume that the initial state
P0 = P. At each time k, Pk takes a value from the set{
P,h
(
P
)
,h2
(
P
)
, . . .
}
. Note that the server is the owner of
the communication network and it has a good knowledge
of the channel transmission process. The server always
knows exactly whether xˆsk|k arrives at the remote estimator
successfully. We assume that the remote estimator sends an
Acknowledgment (ACK) to the client. The ACK is only a
1-bit signal to inform the client that whether the data packet
arrives successfully or not. Thus this is a perfect-information
case for both the server and the client.
III. FINITE TIME HORIZON GAME FRAMEWORK
Consider the following optimization problem in a Markov
game framework. In the finite time horizon (k = 1,2, . . . ,N)
case, for the client, its objective function JC is a linear com-
bination of the trace of expected estimation error covariance
and the cost when using different channels:
max
{γk}
JC ,−
N
∑
k=1
[
ζTr{E[Pk]}+(1−ζ ) [γkWk +(1− γk)W0]
]
,
(19)
for some weight parameter ζ ∈ (0,1). A larger ζ attaches
more importance to the error covariance and a smaller ζ
attaches more importance to the channel costs. For every
{Wk} given by the server, the client needs to determine the
optimal action {γk} to maximize its JC. While for the server,
its objective function JS is the total revenue:
max
{Wk}
JS ,
N
∑
k=1
[γkWk +(1− γk)W0] . (20)
The server is at the leading position in this Stackelberg
game. At each time k, it sets the price Wk first and then the
follower, the client, decides γk sequentially. We define I Sk
as the information set available to the server up to time k,
i.e., I Sk = {P0,P1, . . . ,Pk−1} and I Ck = {P0,P1, . . . ,Pk−1}∪
{W1,W2, . . . ,Wk} for the client. Assume both players are
rational, which means that they take the optimal actions
based on their information sets respectively.
A. Client’s Optimal Policy
In this section, we prove that for each fixed {Wk}, the
client’s optimal policy is deterministic and Markovian, and
has a threshold on Pk−1.
For each given {Wk}, the remote estima-
tor’s state set observed by the client is S ={
Tr
{
P
}
,Tr
{
h
(
P
)}
,Tr
{
h2
(
P
)}
, . . . ,Tr
{
hN
(
P
)}}
due
to the finite time horizon N, and the client’s action set is
A = {0,1}. We formulate this optimization problem as a
Markov decision process (MDP) problem. The stochastic
kernel of the state at the remote estimator is given by:
pk (Tr{Pk} | Tr{Pk−1} ,γk),{
γkλ1+(1− γk)λ2, if Tr{Pk}= Tr{P},
1− γkλ1− (1− γk)λ2, if Tr{Pk}= Tr{h(Pk−1)}.
(21)
It is obvious that the stochastic kernel pk(· | ·, ·)is stationary,
which means it is only dependent on the state and the action.
We can substitute p(· | ·, ·) for it.
The one-stage reward function for the client at time k =
1,2, . . . ,N can be written as:
rk (Tr{Pk−1} ,γk) =−
[
ζTr{E [Pk]}
+(1−ζ )[γkWk +(1− γk)W0]]. (22)
Then the client’s optimization problem can be transformed
equivalently to an MDP problem as follows:
max
{γk}
E
[
N
∑
k=1
rk (Tr{Pk−1} ,γk)
]
(23)
For simplicity, we define the neighbouring
element after and before s in the state set S ={
Tr
{
P
}
,Tr
{
h
(
P
)}
,Tr
{
h2
(
P
)}
, . . . ,Tr
{
hN
(
P
)}}
as
s+,s− respectively, and define Tr
{
P
}
as s0.
Define the optimality equation (also referred to as Bellman
equation or functional equation) as
Vk(s) = sup
a∈A
{
rk(s,a)+
[
p(s0 | s,a)Vk+1(s0)
+p(s+ | s,a)Vk+1(s+)
]} (24)
for k = 1,2, . . . ,N where Vk(·) is a real-valued function and
VN+1(s) = 0. The optimality equations are fundamental tools
to study MDP problems [17]. If the expected total reward
of a policy from period k onward satisfies these optimality
equations for k = 1,2, . . . ,N, then it is optimal.
Theorem 1 Assume that the state set S is finite, and that the
action set A is finite for each state s ∈ S. Then there exists
a deterministic Markovian policy which is optimal.
Proof: Let V ∗k be a solution of the optimality equation
(24). For each k and s∈ S, if there exists an a′ ∈A such that
rk(s,a′)+
[
p(s0|s,a′)V ∗k+1(s0)+ p(s+|s,a′)V ∗k+1(s+)
]
= sup
a∈A
{
rk(s,a)+
[
p(s0|s,a)V ∗k+1(s0)+ p(s+|s,a)V ∗k+1(s+)
]}
,
(25)
then there exists an optimal policy which is deterministic and
Markovian. The proof is given by Theorem 4.4.2 in [17].
Here clearly such an a′ always exists if the action set A is
finite.
The finite state set S and action set A in our problem
determine the existence of a deterministic optimal policy. In
addition, it is Markovian.
Next we prove that the client’s optimal policy under
each given {Wk} has a threshold structure based on the
state. To be more specific, we prove that there exists a
positive εk such that when the current state Tr{Pk−1} ≥ εk,
the optimal policy for the client is to use channel 1. This
result has an intuitive meaning. If the remote estimation
error covariance is extremely large, the client should choose
the high quality channel 1 to ensure a higher packet arrival
probability. Otherwise, the client will choose channel 2
to obtain a lower cost. Thus there is a trade-off between
estimation quality and transmission cost. To prove this, some
preliminary knowledge is needed.
Definition 1 For the well ordered sets X and Y and a real-
valued function g(x,y) on X ×Y , g is superadditive if for
x+ ≥ x− in X and y+ ≥ y− in Y ,
g(x+,y+)+g(x−,y−)≥ g(x+,y−)+g(x−,y+). (26)
Lemma 1 Suppose g is a superadditive function on X ×Y
and for each x ∈ X, max
y∈Y
g(x,y) exists. Then
f (x) = max
{
y∗ ∈ argmax
y∈Y
g(x,y)
}
(27)
is monotone nondecreasing in x.
Proof: Choose y ≤ f (x−). Due to the definition of
superadditivity and f (x),
g
(
x+, f
(
x−
))
+g(x−,y)≥ g(x+,y)+g(x−, f (x−)) , (28)
and
g
(
x−, f
(
x−
))≥ g(x−,y). (29)
Rewriting (28) and combining it with (29) yields
g
(
x+, f
(
x−
))≥ g(x+,y)+ [g(x−, f (x−))−g(x−,y)]
≥ g(x+,y) (30)
for all y≤ f (x−). Due to the definition of f (x),
g
(
x+, f
(
x+
))≥ g(x+, f (x−)) . (31)
Consequently, f (x+)≥ f (x−). The proof is done.
We demonstrate the optimality of monotone policy by
showing that the optimal value function V ∗k (s) for all k is
nonincreasing in s ∈ S and then showing that
Φk(s,a), rk(s,a)+
[
p(s0 | s,a)V ∗k+1(s0)
+p
(
s+ | s,a)V ∗k+1(s+)] (32)
is superadditive.
Theorem 2 The optimal value function V ∗k (s) is nonincreas-
ing in s ∈ S for k = 1,2, . . . ,N.
Proof: Notice that in the finite time horizon problem,
we have V ∗N+1(s) = 0. It is trivial to see that V
∗
N+1(s) is
nonincreasing in s. We prove the monotonicity in a backward
induction way.
Assume that V ∗t (s) is nonincreasing for t = k+1, . . . ,N+1.
By Theorem 1, there exists an optimal a∗s ∈A which obtains
the maximum of Vk(s):
V ∗k (s) = rk(s,a
∗
s )+
[
p(s0 | s,a∗s )V ∗k+1(s0)
+p
(
s+ | s,a∗s
)
V ∗k+1(s
+)
]
.
(33)
Let s′ ≥ s. Due to the well ordered state set S, it is easy
to verify that rk(s,a) is nonincreasing in s for all a ∈ A
and k = 1, . . . ,N and the stochastic kernel p(s+ | s,a) and
p(s0 | s,a) are only dependent on a for all s ∈ S.
V ∗k(s) =
max
a∈A
{
rk(s,a)+
[
p(s0|s,a)V ∗k+1(s0)+ p(s+|s,a)V ∗k+1(s+)
]}
≥rk(s,a∗s′)+
[
p(s0|s,a∗s′)V ∗k+1(s0)+ p(s+|s,a∗s′)V ∗k+1(s+)
]
≥rk(s′,a∗s′)+
[
p(s0|s′,a∗s′)V ∗k+1(s0)+ p(s′+|s′,a∗s′)V ∗k+1(s′+)
]
=V ∗k (s
′).
(34)
Thus V ∗k (s) is nonincreasing for k = 1,2, . . . ,N.
Theorem 3 Φk(s,a) is a superadditive function on S×A.
Proof: First we prove that rk(s,a) is superadditive.[
rk(s,1)+ rk(s−,0)
]− [rk(s,0)+ rk(s−,1)]
=−ζ [λ1s0+(1−λ1)s+]− (1−ζ )Wk
−ζ [λ2s0+(1−λ2)s]− (1−ζ )W0
+ζ
[
λ2s0+(1−λ2)s+
]
+(1−ζ )W0
+ζ [λ1s0+(1−λ1)s]+ (1−ζ )Wk
=ζ (λ1−λ2)
(
s+− s)
≥0,
(35)
which satisfies the definition of superadditive.
Since the sum of two superadditive functions is also
superadditive, we need to prove that the rest of Φk(s,a) is
superadditive. Together with the nonincreasing property of
V ∗k (s) from Theorem 2, we have(
p(s0 | s,1)V ∗k+1(s0)+ p
(
s+ | s,1)V ∗k+1(s+)
+ p
(
s0 | s−,0
)
V ∗k+1(s0)+ p
(
s | s−,0)V ∗k+1(s))
−(p(s0 | s,0)V ∗k+1(s0)+ p(s+ | s,0)V ∗k+1(s+)
+ p
(
s0 | s−,1
)
V ∗k+1(s0)+ p
(
s | s−,1)V ∗k+1(s))
=(λ2−λ1)
(
V ∗k+1(s
+)−V ∗k+1(s)
)
≥0.
(36)
The proof is done.
Thus we can conclude from Theorem 3 and Lemma 1 that
the optimal policy for the client is nondecreasing in the state
at each time epoch. In other words, there is a threshold based
on the state when taking the optimal policy. For the finite
time horizon case, it is feasible to obtain this deterministic
Markovian optimal policy by value iteration and obtain its
threshold.
B. Server’s Optimal Policy
The server is the leading player in this Stackelberg game.
In this section, we show that the server’s optimal policy is
also monotone. The larger the estimation error covariance is,
the higher the price can be set.
In Theorem 4 below, we consider an extension to the
current problem formulation where the server can set any
price Wk ≥W0 for channel 1.
Theorem 4 The optimal price W ∗k is nondecreasing in Pk−1
for k = 1,2, . . . ,N.
Proof: Define the functions Uk(·, ·) : S×R→ R in a
recursive way:
UN+1(PN) = 0, (37)
Uk(Pk−1,Wk) =
max
γk
{
− [ζTr{E[Pk]}+(1−ζ ) [γkWk +(1− γk)W0]]
+[γkλ1+(1− γk)λ2]Uk+1(P,Wk+1)
+[γk(1−λ1)+(1− γk)(1−λ2)]Uk+1 (h(Pk−1),Wk+1)
}
(38)
for k= 1,2, . . . ,N. We prove it using induction. Consider first
the time N. If γN = 1,
UN(PN−1,WN) =
−
[
ζ
[
λ1Tr{P}+(1−λ1)Tr{h(PN−1)}
]
+(1−ζ )WN
]
.
(39)
If γN = 0,
UN(PN−1,WN) =
−
[
ζ
[
λ2Tr{P}+(1−λ2)Tr{h(PN−1)}
]
+(1−ζ )W0
]
.
(40)
The difference of (39) and (40) is
−(1−ζ )(WN−W0)−ζ (λ1−λ2)
(
Tr{P}−Tr{h(PN−1)}
)
.
(41)
The server wishes the client to use channel 1 and at the same
time, to set the price as high as possible. This implies:
(1−ζ )(WN−W0)≤ ζ (λ1−λ2)
(
Tr{h(PN−1)}−Tr{P}
)
.
(42)
Define the price threshold as
W ∗N =
ζ
1−ζ (λ1−λ2)
(
Tr{h(PN−1)}−Tr{P}
)
+W0, (43)
which is the highest price that can be set to ensure the client
to use channel 1. It can be seen that the larger PN−1 is, the
larger the price threshold W ∗N . As a consequence, the smaller
UN(PN−1,W ∗N) is.
Now, assume that W ∗t is nondecreasing in Pt−1 and
Ut(Pt−1,W ∗t ) is nonincreasing in Pt−1 for t = k+ 1, . . . ,N.
Then consider the time k. If γk = 1,
Uk(Pk−1,Wk) =
−
[
ζ
[
λ1Tr{P}+(1−λ1)Tr{h(Pk−1)}
]
+(1−ζ )Wk
]
+λ1Uk+1
(
P,W ∗k+1
)
+(1−λ1)Uk+1
(
h(Pk−1) ,W ∗k+1
)
.
(44)
If γk = 0,
Uk(Pk−1,Wk) =
−
[
ζ
[
λ2Tr{P}+(1−λ2)Tr{h(Pk−1)}
]
+(1−ζ )W0
]
+λ2Uk+1
(
P,W ∗k+1
)
+(1−λ2)Uk+1
(
h(Pk−1) ,W ∗k+1
)
.
(45)
Similarly, the price threshold W ∗k is
W ∗k =
ζ
1−ζ (λ1−λ2)
(
Tr{h(Pk−1)}−Tr{P}
)
+W0
+
1
1−ζ (λ1−λ2)
(
Uk+1
(
P,W ∗k+1
)−Uk+1 (h(Pk−1) ,W ∗k+1)) .
(46)
Then W ∗k is nondecreasing in Pk−1 and Uk(Pk−1,W
∗
k ) is
nonincreasing in Pk−1 by the induction hypothesis. This
monotonicity holds for all k = 1,2, . . . ,N.
For the original WH and WL case, the server sets the price
Wk =

WH , if WH ≤W ∗k ,
WL, if WL ≤W ∗k <WH ,
WH or WL, if W ∗k <WL.
(47)
Thus the server’s optimal policy at each time is characterized
in Fig. 2.
Tr{P} Tr{hN(P )}Tr{h(P )} Tr{hL(P )} Tr{hH(P )}
WHWLWL or WH
Fig. 2. Server’s optimal policy
As the game leader, the server knows that at each given
{Wk}, the client makes decisions based on the current state.
And the server can obtain the policy thresholds Tr{hL(P)}
and Tr{hH(P)} for WL or WH by calculation. When the
current state Tr{Pk−1} ≥ Tr{hH(P)}, the server knows that
the client chooses channel 1 even if the price is WH .
Thus setting WH maximizes the server’s objective function.
When Tr{hL(P)} ≤ Tr{Pk−1} < Tr{hH(P)}, setting WL is
the server’s optimal policy. When Tr{Pk−1}< Tr{hL(P)}, no
matter what price the server sets, the state is still good and
the client always chooses channel 2.
C. Equilibrium Analysis
This is a Stackelberg game model, where the server has
priority over the client. For both the server and the client,
they make decisions based on the current state. In the first
period, the server sets the price. This decision is irreversible.
In the second period, the client chooses a channel after
observing the price given by the server. By value iteration,
the threshold can be calculated and both players can obtain
their optimal policies to maximize their objectives. This is
the equilibrium in this scenario.
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, numerical examples are provided to illus-
trate the optimal policies for both players.
Consider the example with parameters of the unsta-
ble system where A =
[
1.2 0
0 0.9
]
,C =
[
1 0
]
,Q =[
0.3 0
0 0.3
]
,R= 0.3 and communication network channels
where λ1 = 0.99,λ2 = 0.2. Set the weight parameter ζ = 0.5.
Assume W0 = 5 and set WH = 100, WL = 10. Let the server’s
pricing strategy be {Wk =WL} and {Wk =WH} respectively.
Now we apply the value iteration algorithm to the finite time
horizon where N = 20. The client’s optimal monotone policy
of {WL} and {WH} at time step k = 4 is shown in Fig. 3.
Whether at WH or WL, the client’s optimal policy is monotone
in the state.
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Fig. 3. Client’s optimal policy γ∗k for different states under WL and WH at
time k = 4
Consider the server’s optimal pricing setting strategy.
Assume that W0 = 5, WL = 5.3 and WH = 5.5, and the finite
time horizon is N = 5. The server’s optimal policy is plotted
in Fig. 4. It can be seen that the server’s optimal policy is
monotone in the state at each time. The worse the current
state is, the higher the price can be set. This “Fishing in
Troubled Water” action makes server benefit most from the
misfortunes of the client. However, the price cannot be set
too high in case the client does not choose channel 1. Thus
this optimal policy is of significance to the server.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We considered channel pricing and selection in a Stack-
elberg game framework. Using tools from Markov decision
process, we proved the existence of an optimal determin-
istic and Markovian policy for the client and its monotone
property in the finite time horizon case. Value iteration can
be applied to calculate optimal policies both for the server
and client. Future work includes considering the infinite time
horizon case, and channel pricing and selection with multiple
clients where the number of clients affects the transmission
quality of channels. Also, imperfect information Stackelberg
Fig. 4. Server’s optimal policy W ∗k for different states when N = 5
game can be explored, which induces a partially observable
Markov decision process problem.
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